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Every year, in the United States foodborne
infections cause millions of illnesses and
thousands of deaths; most infections go undiag-
nosed and unreported. As the epidemiology of
foodborne infections evolves, old scenarios and
solutions need to be updated. This article
reviews main trends in the evolution of
foodborne disease epidemiology and their effect
on surveillance and prevention activities.
Preventing foodborne disease is a multifac-
eted process, without simple and universal
solutions. For most foodborne pathogens, no
vaccines are available. Consumer education
about basic principles of food safety, an important
component of prevention, by itself is insufficient.
Food reaches the consumer through long chains
of industrial production, in which many
opportunities for contamination exist. The
general strategy of prevention is to understand
the mechanisms by which contamination and
disease transmission can occur well enough to
interrupt them. An outbreak investigation or
epidemiologic study should go beyond identifying
a suspected food and pulling it from the shelf to
defining the chain of events that allowed
contamination with an organism in large enough
numbers to cause illness. We learn from the
investigation what went wrong, in order to devise
strategies to prevent similar events in the future.
Although outbreaks make the news, most
foodborne infections occur as individual or
sporadic cases. Therefore, the sources of sporadic
cases must also be investigated and understood.
Emerging Foodborne Pathogens
Substantial progress has been made in
preventing foodborne diseases. For example,
typhoid fever, extremely common at the
beginning of the 20th century, is now almost
forgotten in the United States. It was conquered
in the preantibiotic era by disinfection of drinking
water, sewage treatment, milk sanitation and
pasteurization, and shellfish bed sanitation
(Figure 1). Similarly, cholera, bovine tuberculo-
sis, and trichinosis have also been controlled in
the United States. However, new foodborne
pathogens have emerged. Among the first of
these were infections caused by nontyphoid
strains of Salmonella, which have increased
decade by decade since World War II (Figure 1).
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The epidemiology of foodborne disease is changing. New pathogens have
emerged, and some have spread worldwide. Many, including Salmonella, Escherichia
coli O157:H7, Campylobacter, and Yersinia enterocolitica, have reservoirs in healthy
food animals, from which they spread to an increasing variety of foods. These pathogens
cause millions of cases of sporadic illness and chronic complications, as well as large
and challenging outbreaks over many states and nations. Improved surveillance that
combines rapid subtyping methods, cluster identification, and collaborative
epidemiologic investigation can identify and halt large, dispersed outbreaks. Outbreak
investigations and case-control studies of sporadic cases can identify sources of
infection and guide the development of specific prevention strategies. Better
understanding of how pathogens persist in animal reservoirs is also critical to successful
long-term prevention. In the past, the central challenge of foodborne disease lay in
preventing the contamination of human food with sewage or animal manure. In the
future, prevention of foodborne disease will increasingly depend on controlling
contamination of feed and water consumed by the animals themselves.426 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997
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In the last 20 years, other infectious agents have
been either newly described or newly associated
with foodborne transmission (Table 1). Vibrio
vulnificus,  Escherichia coli O157:H7, and
Cyclospora cayetanensis are examples of newly
described pathogens that often are foodborne. V.
vulnificus was identified in the bloodstream of
persons with underlying liver disease who had
fulminant infections after eating raw oysters or
being exposed to seawater; this organism lives in
the sea and can be a natural summertime
commensal organism in shellfish (1). E. coli
O157:H7 was first identified as a pathogen in
1982 in an outbreak of bloody diarrhea traced to
hamburgers from a fast-food chain (2); it was
subsequently shown to have a reservoir in
healthy cattle (3). Cyclospora, known previously
as a cyanobacterialike organism, received its
current taxonomic designation in 1992 and
emerged as a foodborne pathogen in outbreaks
traced to imported Guatemalan raspberries in
1996 (4,5). The similarity of Cyclospora to
Eimeria coccidian pathogens of birds suggests
an avian reservoir (4,5).
Some known pathogens have only recently
been shown to be predominantly foodborne. For
example, Listeria monocytogenes was long known
as a cause of meningitis and other invasive
infections in immunocompromised hosts. How
these hosts became infected remained unknown
until a series of investigations identified food as
the most common source (6). Similarly, Campy-
lobacter jejuni was known as a rare opportunistic
bloodstream infection until veterinary diagnostic
methods used on specimens from humans showed
it was a common cause of diarrheal illness (7).
Subsequent epidemiologic investigations im-
plicated poultry and raw milk as the most
common sources of sporadic cases and out-
breaks, respectively (8). Yersinia enterocolitica,
rare in the United States but a common cause of
diarrheal illness and pseudoappendicitis in
northern Europe and elsewhere, is now known
to be most frequently associated with
undercooked pork (9).
These foodborne pathogens share a number
of characteristics. Virtually all have an animal
reservoir from which they spread to humans; that
is, they are foodborne zoonoses. In marked
contrast to many established zoonoses, these new
zoonoses do not often cause illness in the infected
host animal. The chicken with lifelong ovarian
infection with Salmonella serotype Enteritidis,
the calf carrying E. coli O157:H7, and the oyster
carrying Norwalk virus or V. vulnificus appear
healthy; therefore, public health concerns must
now include apparently healthy animals. Limited
existing research on how animals acquire and
transmit emerging pathogens among themselves
often implicates contaminated fodder and water;
therefore, public health concerns must now
include the safety of what food animals
themselves eat and drink.
For reasons that remain unclear, these
pathogens can rapidly spread globally. For
example,  Y. enterocolitica spread globally among
pigs in the 1970s (10); Salmonella serotype
Enteritidis appeared simultaneously around the
world in the 1980s (11); and Salmonella
Typhimurium Definitive Type (DT) 104 is now
appearing in North America, Europe, and
Figure 1. Reported incidence of typhoid fever and
nontyphoidal salmonellosis in the United States,
1920–1995.
Table 1. New pathogens that are foodborne and
pathogens newly recognized as predominantly
foodborne in the United States in the last 20 years
Campylobacter jejuni
Campylobacter fetus ssp. fetus
Cryptosporidium cayetanensis
Escherichia coli O157:H7 and related E. coli
  (e.g., O111:NM, O104:H21)
Listeria monocytogenes
Norwalk-like viruses
Nitzschia pungens (cause of amnesic
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perhaps elsewhere (12); therefore, public
health concerns must now include events
happening around the world, as harbingers of
what may appear here.
Many emerging zoonotic pathogens are
becoming increasingly resistant to antimicrobial
agents, largely because of the widespread use of
antibiotics in the animal reservoir. For example,
Campylobacter isolated from human patients in
Europe is now increasingly resistant to
fluoroquinolones, after these agents were
introduced for use in animals (13). Salmonellae
have become increasing resistant to a variety of
antimicrobial agents in the United States (14);
therefore, public health concerns must include
the patterns of antimicrobial use in agriculture as
well as in human medicine.
The foods contaminated with emerging
pathogens usually look, smell, and taste normal,
and the pathogen often survives traditional
preparation techniques: E. coli O157:H7 in meat
can survive the gentle heating that a rare
hamburger gets (15); Salmonella Enteritidis in
eggs survives in an omelette (16); and Norwalk
virus in oysters survives gentle steaming (17).
Following standard and traditional recipes can
cause illness and outbreaks. Contamination with
the new foodborne zoonoses eludes traditional
food inspection, which relies on visual identifica-
tion of foodborne hazards. These pathogens
demand new control strategies, which would
minimize the likelihood of contamination in the
first place. The rate at which new pathogens have
been identified suggests that many more remain
to be discovered. Many of the foodborne infections
of the future are likely to arise from the animal
reservoirs from which we draw our food supply.
Once a new foodborne disease is identified, a
number of critical questions need to be answered
to develop a rational approach to prevention:
What is the nature of the disease? What is the
nature of the pathogen? What are simple ways
to easily identify the pathogen and diagnose
the disease? What is the incidence of the
infection? How can the disease be treated?
Which foods transmit the infection? How does
the pathogen get into the food, and how well
does it persist there? Is there is an animal
reservoir? How do the animals themselves
become infected? How can the disease be
prevented? Does the prevention strategy work?
The answers to these questions do not come
rapidly. Knowledge accumulates gradually, as a
result of detailed scientific investigations, often
conducted during outbreaks (18). After 15 years
of research, we know a great deal about infections
with  E. coli O157:H7, but we still do not know
how best to treat the infection, nor how the cattle
(the principal source of infection for humans)
themselves become infected. Better slaughter
procedures and pasteurization of milk are useful
control strategies for this pathogen in meat and
milk, as irradiation of meat may be in the future.
More needs to be learned: for example, it remains
unclear how best to prevent this organism from
contaminating lettuce or apple juice. For more
recently identified agents, even less is known.
New Food Vehicles of Transmission
Along with new pathogens, an array of new
food vehicles of transmission have been impli-
cated in recent years. Traditionally, the food
implicated in a foodborne outbreak was
undercooked meat, poultry or seafood, or
unpasteurized milk. Now, additional foods
previously thought safe are considered hazard-
ous. For example, for centuries, the internal
contents of an egg were presumed safe to eat raw.
However, epidemic Salmonella Enteritidis infec-
tion among egg-laying flocks indicates that intact
eggs may have internal contamination with this
Salmonella serotype. Many outbreaks are caused
by contaminated shell eggs, including eggs used
in such traditional recipes as eggnog and Caesar
salad, lightly cooked eggs in omelettes and
French toast, and even foods one would presume
thoroughly cooked, such as lasagna and
meringue pie (19,20). E. coli O157:H7 has caused
illness through an ever-broadening spectrum of
foods, beyond the beef and raw milk that are
directly related to the bovine reservoir. In 1992,
an outbreak caused by apple cider showed that
this organism could be transmitted through a
food with a pH level of less than 4.0, possibly after
contact of fresh produce with manure (21). A
recent outbreak traced to venison jerky suggests
a wild deer reservoir, so both cattle and feral deer
manure are of concern (22). Imported raspberries
contaminated with Cyclospora caused an epi-
demic in the United States in 1996, possibly
because contaminated surface water was used to
spray the berries with fungicide before harvest
(5). Norwalk-like viruses, which appear to have a
human reservoir, have contaminated oysters
harvested from pristine waters by oyster catchers
who did not use toilets with holding tanks on428 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997
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their boats and were themselves the likely
source of the virus (23).
The new food vehicles of disease share
several features. Contamination typically occurs
early in the production process, rather than just
before consumption. Because of consumer demand
and the global food market, ingredients from many
countries may be combined in a single dish, which
makes the specific source of contamination difficult
to trace. These foods have fewer barriers to
microbial growth, such as salt, sugar, or
preservatives; therefore, simple transgressions can
make the food unsafe. Because the food has a short
shelf life, it may often be gone by the time the
outbreak is recognized; therefore, efforts to prevent
contamination at the source are very important.
An increasing, though still limited, propor-
tion of reported foodborne outbreaks are being
traced to fresh produce (24). A series of outbreaks
recently investigated by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) has linked a
variety of pathogens to fresh fruits and
vegetables harvested in the United States and
elsewhere (Table 2). The investigations have
often been triggered by detection of more cases
than expected of a rare serotype of Salmonella or
Shigella or by diagnosis of a rare infection like
cyclosporiasis. Outbreaks caused by common
serotypes are more likely to be missed. Various
possible points of contamination have been
identified during these investigations, including
contamination during production and harvest,
initial processing and packing, distribution, and
final processing (Table 3). For example, fresh or
inadequately composted manure is used some-
times, although E. coli O157:H7 has been shown
to survive for up to 70 days in bovine feces (25).
Untreated or contaminated water seems to be a
particularly likely source of contamination.
Water used for spraying, washing, and maintain-
ing the appearance of produce must be
microbiologically safe. After two large outbreaks
of salmonellosis were traced to imported
cantaloupe, the melon industry considered a
“Melon Safety Plan,” focusing particularly on the
chlorination of water used to wash melons and to
make ice for shipping them. Although the extent
to which the plan was implemented is unknown,
no further large outbreaks have occurred. After
two large outbreaks of salmonellosis were traced
to a single tomato packer in the Southeast, an
automated chlorination system was developed for
the packing plant wash tank. Because tomatoes
absorb water (and associated bacteria) if washed
in water colder than they are, particular
attention was also focused on the temperature of
the water bath (26,27). No further outbreaks
have been linked to southeastern tomatoes.
Similar attention is warranted for water used to
rinse lettuce heads in packing sheds and to crisp
them in grocery stores as well as for water used in
processing other fresh produce.
A New Outbreak Scenario
Because of changes in the way food is
produced and distributed, a new kind of outbreak
has appeared. The traditional foodborne out-
break scenario often follows a church supper,
family picnic, wedding reception, or other social
Table 2. Foodborne outbreaks traced to fresh produce,
1990–1996
 Cases States
Yr. Pathogen Vehicle (No.) (No.) Source
'90 S. Chester Cantaloupe   245 30 C.A.a
'90 S. Javiana Tomatoes   174   4 U.S.b
'90 Hepatitis A Strawberries    18   2 U.S.
'91 S. Poona Cantaloupe >400 23 U.S./
C.A.
'93 E. coli O157:H7 Apple cider     23   1 U.S.
'93 S. Montevideo Tomatoes     84   3 U.S.
'94 Shigella flexneri Scallions     72   2 C.A.
'95 S. Stanley Alfalfa   242 17 N.K.c
sprouts
'95 S. Hartford Orange juice    63 21 U.S.
'95 E. coli O157:H7 Leaf lettuce     70   1 U.S.
'96 E. coli O157:H7 Leaf lettuce     49   2 U.S.
'96 Cyclospora Raspberries   978 20 C.A.
'96 E. coli O157:H7 Apple juice     71   3 U.S.
aCentral America
bUnited States
cSource not known
Table 3. Events and potential contamination sources
during produce processing
Event Contamination sources
Production and harvest
Growing, picking, Irrigation water, manure,
bundling   lack of field sanitation
Initial processing
Washing, waxing, Wash water, handling
sorting, boxing
Distribution
Trucking Ice, dirty trucks
Final processing
Slicing, squeezing, Wash water, handling,
shredding, peeling   cross-contamination429 Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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event. This scenario involves an acute and highly
local outbreak, with a high inoculum dose and a
high attack rate. The outbreak is typically
immediately apparent to those in the local group,
who promptly involve medical and public
health authorities. The investigation identifies
a food-handling error in a small kitchen that
occurs shortly before consumption. The solu-
tion is also local. Such outbreaks still occur, and
handling them remains an important function
of a local health department.
However, diffuse and widespread outbreaks,
involving many counties, states, and even
nations (28), are identified more frequently and
follow an entirely different scenario. The new
scenario is the result of low-level contamination
of a widely distributed commercial food product.
In most jurisdictions, the increase in cases may
be inapparent against the background illness.
The outbreak is detected only because of a
fortuitous concentration of cases in one location,
because the pathogen causing the outbreak is
unusual, or because laboratory-based subtyping
of strains collected over a wide area identifies a
diffuse surge in one subtype. In such outbreaks,
investigation can require coordinated efforts of a
large team to clarify the extent of the outbreak,
implicate a specific food, and determine the
source of contamination. Often, no obvious
terminal food-handling error is found. Instead,
contamination is the result of an event in the
industrial chain of food production. Investigat-
ing, controlling, and preventing such outbreaks
can have industrywide implications.
These diffuse outbreaks can be caused by a
variety of foods. Because fresh produce is usually
widely distributed, most of the produce-related
outbreaks listed in Table 2 were multistate
events. Some of the largest outbreaks affected
most states at once. For example, a recent
outbreak of Salmonella Enteritidis infections
caused by a nationally distributed brand of ice
cream affected the entire nation (29). Although it
caused an estimated 250,000 illnesses, it was
detected only when vigorous routine surveillance
identified a surge in reported infections with S.
Enteritidis in one area of southern Minnesota.
The consumers affected did not make food-
handling errors with their ice cream, so food
safety instruction could not have prevented this
outbreak. The ice cream premix was transported
after pasteurization to the ice cream factory in
tanker trucks that had been used to haul raw
eggs. The huge epidemic was the result of a
basic failure on an industrial scale to separate
the raw from the cooked.
S. Enteritidis infections also illustrate why
surveillance and investigation of sporadic cases
are needed. A diffuse increase in sporadic cases
can occur well before a local or large outbreak
focuses attention on the emergence of a pathogen.
The isolation rate for S. Enteritidis began to
increase sharply in the New England region in
1978 (Figure 2); all cases were sporadic. In 1982,
an outbreak in a New England nursing home was
traced to eggs from a local supplier. However, the
egg connection was not really appreciated until
1986, when a large multistate outbreak of S.
Enteritidis infections was traced to stuffed pasta
made with raw eggs and labeled “fully cooked.”
This outbreak, affecting an estimated 3,000
persons in seven states, led to the documentation
that  S. Enteritidis was present on egg-laying
farms and to the subsequent demonstration that
both outbreaks and sporadic cases of infections
were associated with shell eggs (19,30). Since
then, Enteritidis has become the most common
serotype of Salmonella isolated in the United
States, accounting for 25% of all Salmonella
reported in the country and causing outbreaks
coast to coast. Eggs remain the dominant source
of these infections, causing large outbreaks when
they are pooled and undercooked and individual
sporadic cases among consumers who eat
individual eggs (20,31). Perhaps focused investi-
gation and control measures taken when the
localized increase in sporadic Salmonella cases
was just beginning might have prevented the
subsequent spread.
Figure 2. Salmonella Enteritidis isolation rates from
humans by region, United States, 1970–1996.
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Changing Surveillance Strategies
In the United States, surveillance for
diseases of major public health importance has
been conducted for many years. The legal
framework for surveillance resides in the state
public health epidemiology offices, which share
data with CDC. The first surveillance systems
depended on physician or coroner notification of
specific diseases and conditions, with reports
going first to the local health department, then to
state and federal offices. Now electronic, this
form of surveillance is still used for many specific
conditions (32). In 1962, a second channel was
developed specifically for Salmonella, to take
advantage of the added public health information
provided by subtyping the strains of bacteria (33).
Clinical laboratories that isolated Salmonella
from humans were requested or required to send
the strains to the state public health laboratory
for serotyping. Although knowing the serotype is
usually of little benefit to the individual patient,
it has been critical to protecting and improving
the health of the public at large. Serotyping
allows cases that might otherwise appear
unrelated to be included in an investigation
because they are of the same serotype. Moreover,
infections that are close in time and space to an
outbreak but are caused by nonoutbreak
serotypes and are probably unrelated can be
discounted. Results of serotyping are now sent
electronically from public health laboratories and
can be rapidly analyzed and summarized.
Salmonella  serotyping was the first subtype-based
surveillance system and is a model for similar
systems (34). Yet another source of surveillance
data involves summary reports of foodborne
disease outbreak investigations from local and state
health departments (35). About 400 such outbreaks
are reported annually, by a system that remains
paper-based, labor-intensive, and slow.
Existing surveillance systems provide a
limited and relatively inexpensive net for tracing
large-scale trends in foodborne diseases under
surveillance and for detecting outbreaks of
established pathogens in the United States.
However, they are less sensitive to diffuse
outbreaks of common pathogens, provide little
detail on sporadic cases, and are not easy to
extend to emerging pathogens. In the future,
changes in health delivery may impinge on the
way that diagnoses are made and reported,
leading to artifactual changes in reported
disease incidence.
Therefore, CDC, in collaboration with state
health departments and federal food regulatory
agencies, is enhancing national surveillance for
foodborne diseases in several ways. First, the role
of subtyping in public health laboratories is being
expanded to encompass new molecular subtyping
methods. Beginning in 1997, a national subtyping
network for E. coli O157:H7 of participating state
public health department laboratories and CDC
will use a single standardized laboratory protocol
to subtype strains of this important pathogen.
The standard method, pulsed-field gel electro-
phoresis, can be easily adapted to other bacterial
pathogens. In this network, each participating
laboratory will be able to routinely compare the
genetic gel patterns of strains of E. coli O157:H7
with the patterns in a national pattern bank. This
will enable rapid detection of clusters of related
cases within the state and will focus investiga-
tive resources on the cases most likely to be
linked. It will also enable related cases
scattered across several states to be linked so
that a common source can be sought.
Another surveillance strategy, now imple-
mented, is active surveillance in sentinel
populations. Since January 1996, at five U.S.
sentinel sites, additional surveillance resources
make it possible to contact laboratories directly
for regular reporting of bacterial infections likely to
be foodborne (36; Figure 3). In addition, surveys of
the population, physicians, and laboratories
measure the proportion of diarrheal diseases that
are undiagnosed and unreported so that the true
disease incidence can be estimated. This
surveillance, known as FoodNet, is the platform
on which more detailed investigations, including
case-control studies of sporadic cases of common
foodborne infections, are being conducted.
Figure 3. Incidence of three infections in FoodNet
surveillance areas, 1996.
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Yet another new surveillance initiative is the
routine monitoring of antimicrobial resistance
among a sample of Salmonella and E. coli
O157:H7 bacteria isolated from humans (37). A
new cluster detection algorithm is being
applied routinely to surveillance data for
Salmonella at the national level, making it
possible to detect and flag possible outbreaks as
soon as the data are reported (38). Implementa-
tion of such algorithms for other infections and
at the state level will further increase the
usefulness of routine surveillance.
Further enhancements are possible as active
surveillance through FoodNet is extended to a
wider spectrum of infections, including foodborne
parasitic and viral infections. In 1997, active
surveillance for Cyclospora began in FoodNet,
which quickly resulted in the detection of a
diffuse outbreak among persons who had been on
a Caribbean cruise ship that made stops in
Mexico and Central America (CDC, unpub. data).
Application of standardized molecular subtyping
methods to other foodborne pathogens will provide
a more sensitive warning system for diffuse
outbreaks of a variety of pathogens. To handle
outbreaks in areas not covered by FoodNet,
standard surveillance and investigative capacities
in state health department epidemiology offices
and laboratories should be strengthened. In
addition, enhanced international consultation will
be critical to better detect and investigate
international or global outbreaks (28).
Implications of the New Outbreak
Scenario for Public Health Activities
Our public health infrastructure is tiered,
both in surveillance responsibilities and in
response to emergency situations (39). At the
local level, the county or city health department,
first developed in response to epidemic cholera
and other challenges in the 19th century, is
responsible for most basic surveillance, investi-
gation, and prevention activities. At the state
level, epidemiologists, public health laboratorians,
sanitarians, and educators conduct statewide
surveillance and prevention activities and
consult with and support local authorities. At the
national level, CDC is the primary risk-
assessment agency for public health hazards and
conducts the primary national surveillance as
well as epidemic response in support of state
health departments. The Food and Drug
Administration, Department of Agriculture, and
Environmental Protection Agency are the
primary regulatory agencies, charged with
specific responsibilities regarding the nation’s
food and water supplies that interlock and are not
always predictable. The Food and Drug Adminis-
tration regulates low-acid canned foods, im-
ported foods, pasteurized milk, many seafoods,
rabbits raised for meat, and food and water
provided on aircraft and trains. The Department
of Agriculture regulates meat and poultry,
including primary slaughter and further process-
ing, and pasteurized eggs; investigates animal
and plant diseases; and maintains the county
extension outreach program. Shell eggs do not
have a clear regulatory home, as the Department
of Agriculture regulates the grading of shell eggs
for quality, but the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, since 1995, has responsibility for the
microbiologic safety of shell eggs.
The new outbreak scenario has several
implications for the practice of public health,
starting at the local level. One is that when
diffuse outbreaks are detected, a local health
department may need to investigate a few cases
that are part of a larger outbreak despite their
apparently small local impact. Second, an
apparently local outbreak may herald the first
recognized manifestation of a national or even
international event.
When a diffuse outbreak of a potentially
foodborne pathogen is detected, rapid investiga-
tion is needed to determine whether the outbreak
is foodborne, and if possible, identify a specific
food vehicle. These investigations, which typi-
cally include case-control studies, may need to be
conducted in several locations at once. While all
cases or all affected states may not need to be
included in such an investigation, combining
cases from several locations in one investigation
and repeating the investigation in more than one
location can be helpful. For example, in a recent
international outbreak of Salmonella Stanley
infections traced to alfalfa sprouts, concentra-
tions of cases in Arizona, Michigan, and Finland
led to case-control studies in each location, each
of which linked illness to eating sprouts grown
from the same batch of alfalfa seeds. This proved
that the seeds were contaminated at the source
(40). Parallel investigations can also lead to new
twists. In the large West Coast outbreak of E. coli
O157:H7 infections in 1993, a parallel investiga-
tion conducted in Nevada identified a type of
hamburger other than the one implicated in the432 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997
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initial case-control investigation in Washington,
leading to a broader recall and a more complete
investigation of the circumstances of contamina-
tion (15,41). Because well-conducted investiga-
tions may lead to major product recalls,
industrial review, and overhaul, and even
international embargoes, it is essential that they
be of the highest scientific quality.
Foodborne outbreaks are investigated for two
main reasons. The first is to identify and control
an ongoing source by emergency action: product
recall, restaurant closure, or other temporary but
definitive solutions. The second reason is to learn
how to prevent future similar outbreaks from
occurring. In the long run this second purpose
will have an even greater impact on public health
than simply identifying and halting the
outbreaks. Because all the answers are not
available and existing regulations may not be
sufficient to prevent outbreaks, the scientific
investigation often requires a careful evaluation
of the chain of production. This traceback is an
integral part of the outbreak investigation. It is
not a search for regulatory violations, but rather
an effort to determine where and how
contamination occurred. Often, the contamina-
tion scenario reveals that a critical point has been
lost. Therefore, epidemiologists must participate
in traceback investigations.
Intervention during outbreaks often depends
on having enough good epidemiologic data to act
with confidence, without waiting for a definitive
laboratory test, particularly if potentially lethal
illnesses are involved. For example, if five
persons with classic clinical botulism ate at the
same restaurant the preceding day (but have
nothing else apparent in common), prudence
dictates closing the restaurant quickly while the
outbreak is sorted out—that is, before a specific
food is identified or confirmatory cultures are
made, which may take several days or even
weeks. Good epidemiologic data, including
evidence of a clear statistical association with a
specific exposure, biologic plausibility of the
illness syndrome, the potential hazard of that
food, and the logical consistency of distribution of
the suspect food and cases are essential.
The role of the regulatory agency laboratory
is also affected by the new scenario. Because of
the short shelf life and broad distribution of many
of the new foods responsible for infection, by the
time the outbreak is recognized and investigated
the relevant food may no longer be available for
culture. Because contamination may be re-
stricted to a single production lot, blind sampling
of similar foods that does not include the
implicated lot can give a false sense of security.
Good epidemiologic information pointing to
contamination of a specific food or production lot
should guide the microbiologic sampling and the
interpretation of the results. Available methods
may be insufficient to detect low-level contamina-
tion, even of well-established pathogens.
New Approaches to the Prevention of
Foodborne Disease
Meeting the complex challenge of foodborne
disease prevention will require the collaboration
of regulatory agencies and industry to make food
safely and keep it safe throughout the industrial
chain of production. Prevention can be “built in”
to the industry by identifying and controlling the
key points—from field, farm, or fishing ground to
the dinner table—at which contamination can
either occur or be eliminated. The general
strategy known as Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points (HACCP) replaces the strategy of
final product inspection. Some simple control
strategies are self-evident, once the reality of
microbial contamination is recognized. For
example, shipping fruit from Central America
with clean ice or in closed refrigerator trucks,
rather than with ice made from untreated river
water, is common sense. Similarly, requiring
oyster harvesters to use toilets with holding
tanks on their oyster boats is an obvious way to
reduce fecal contamination of shallow oyster
beds. Pasteurization provides the extra barrier
that will prevent E. coli O157:H7 and other
pathogens from contaminating a large batch of
freshly squeezed juice.
For many foodborne diseases, multiple
choices for prevention are available, and the best
answer may be to apply several steps simulta-
neously. For E. coli O157:H7 infections related to
the cattle reservoir, pasteurizing milk and
cooking meat thoroughly provide an important
measure of protection but are insufficient by
themselves. Options for better control include
continued improvements in slaughter plant
hygiene and control measures under HACCP,
developing additives to cattle feed that alter the
microbial growth either in the feed or in the
bovine rumen to make cows less hospitable hosts
for  E. coli O157, immunizing or otherwise
protecting the cows so that they do not become433 Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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infected in the first place, and irradiating beef
after slaughter. For C. jejuni infections related to
the poultry reservoir, future control options may
include modification of the slaughter process to
reduce contamination of chicken carcasses by bile
or by water baths, freezing chicken carcasses to
reduce Campylobacter counts, chlorinating the
water that chickens drink to prevent them from
getting infected, vaccinating chickens, and
irradiating poultry carcasses after slaughter.
Outbreaks are often fertile sources of new
research questions. Translating these questions
into research agendas is an important part of the
overall prevention effort. Applied research is
needed to improve strategies of subtyping and
surveillance. Veterinary and agricultural re-
search on the farm is needed to answer the
questions about whether and how a pathogen
such as E. coli O157:H7 persists in the bovine
reservoir, to establish the size and dynamics of a
reservoir for this organism in wild deer, and to
look at potential routes of contamination
connecting animal manure and lettuce fields.
More research is needed regarding foods defined
as sources in large outbreaks to develop better
control strategies and better barriers to
contamination and microbial growth and to
understand the behavior of new pathogens in
specific foods. Research is also needed to improve
the diagnosis, clinical management, and treat-
ment of severe foodborne infections and to
improve our understanding of the pathogenesis
of new and emerging pathogens. To assess and
evaluate potential prevention strategies, applied
research is needed into the costs and potential
benefits of each or of combinations.
To prepare for the 21st century, we will
enhance our public health food safety infra-
structure by adding new surveillance and
subtyping strategies and strengthening the
ability of public health practitioners to
investigate and respond quickly. We need to
encourage the prudent use of antibiotics in
animal and human medicine to limit antimicro-
bial resistance. We need to continue basic and
applied research into the microbes that cause
foodborne disease and into the mechanisms by
which they contaminate our foods and cause
outbreaks and sporadic cases. Better under-
standing of foodborne pathogens is the
foundation for new approaches to disease
prevention and control.
References
    1. Blake PA, Merson MH, Weaver RE, Hollis DG,
Heublein PC. Disease caused by a marine vibrio:
clinical characteristics and epidemiology. N Engl J
Med 1979;300:1-5.
  2. Riley LW, Remis RS, Helgerson SD, McGee HB, Wells
JG, Davis BR, et al. Hemorrhagic colitis associated
with a rare Escherichia coli serotype. N Engl J Med
1983;308:681.
  3. Martin ML, Shipman LD, Wells JG, Potter ME, Hedberg
K, Wachsmuth IK, et al. Isolation of Escherichia coli
O157:H7 from dairy cattle associated with two cases of
hemolytic uremic syndrome. Lancet 1986;2:1043.
  4. Ortega YR, Sterling CR, Gilman RH, Cama VA, Diaz F.
Cyclospora species—a new protozoan pathogen of
humans. N Engl J Med 1993;328:1308-12.
  5. Herwaldt BL, Ackers M-L, the Cyclospora Working
Group. International outbreak of cyclosporiasis
associated with imported raspberries. N Engl J Med. In
press 1997.
    6. Jackson LA, Wenger JD. Listeriosis: a foodborne
disease. Infections in Medicine 1993;10:61-6.
  7. Dekeyser PJ, Gossin-Detrain M, Butzler JP, Sternon J.
Acute enteritis due to related Vibrio; first positive stool
cultures. J Infect Dis 1972;125:390-2.
    8. Tauxe RV. Epidemiology of Campylobacter jejuni
infections in the United States and other industrialized
nations. In: Nachamkin I, Blaser MJ, Tompkins L,
editors. Campylobacter jejuni: current status and
future trends, eds. Washington (DC): American Society
of Microbiology, 1992. pp 9-19.
    9. Tauxe RV, Vandepitte J, Wauters G, Martin SM,
Goosens V, DeMol P, et al. Yersinia enterocolitica
infections and pork: the missing link. Lancet
1987;1:1129-32.
10. World Health Organization. Worldwide spread of
infections with Yersinia enterocolitica. WHO Chronicle
1976;30:494-6.
11. Rodrigue DC, Tauxe RV, Rowe B. International
increase in Salmonella enteritidis: a new pandemic?
Epidemiol Infect 1990;105:21-7.
12. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Multidrug-
resistant Salmonella serotype Typhimurium—United
States, 1996. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
1997;46:308-10.
13. Endt HP, Ruijs GJ, van Klingeren B, Jansen WH, van
der Reyden T, Mouton RP. Quinolone resistance in
Campylobacter isolated from man and poultry
following the introduction of fluoroquinolones in
veterinary medicine. J Antimicrob Chemother
1991;27:199-208.
14. Lee LA, Puhr ND, Maloney K, Bean NH, Tauxe RV.
Increase in antimicrobial-resistant Salmonella
infections in the United States, 1989-1990. J Infect Dis
1994;170:128-34.
15. Cieslak PR, Noble SJ, Maxson DJ, Empey LC,
Ravenholt O, Legarza G, et al. Hamburger-associated
Escherichia coli O157:H7 in Las Vegas: a hidden
epidemic. Am J Public Health 1997;87:176-80.
16. Humphrey TJ, Greenwood M, Gilbert RJ, Rowe B,
Chapman PA. The survival of salmonellas in shell eggs
cooked under simulated domestic conditions. Epidemiol
Infect 1989;103:35-45.434 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997
Special Issue
17. Kirkland KB, Meriwether RA, Leiss JK, MacKenzie
WR. Steaming oysters does not prevent Norwalk-like
gastroenteritis. Public Health Rep 1996;111:527-30.
18. Holmberg SD, Feldman RA. New and newer enteric
pathogens: stages in our knowledge. Am J Public
Health 1984;74:205-7.
19. St. Louis ME, Morse DL, Potter ME, DeMelfi TM,
Guzewich JJ, Tauxe RV, et al. The emergence of Grade
A eggs as a major source of Salmonella enteritidis
infections: implications for the control of salmonellosis.
JAMA 1988;259:2103-7.
20. Mishu B, J Koehler, Lee LA, Rodrigue D, Brenner FH,
Blake P, Tauxe RV. Outbreaks of Salmonella
enteritidis infections in the United States, 1985-1991. J
Infect Dis 1994;169:547-52.
21. Besser RE, Lett SM, Weber JT, Doyle MP, Barrett TJ,
Wells JG, Griffin PM. An outbreak of diarrhea and
hemolytic uremic syndrome from Escherichia coli
O157:H7 in fresh-pressed apple cider. JAMA
1993;269:2217-20.
22. Keene WE, Sazie E, Kok J, Rice DH, Hancock DD,
Balan VK, et al. An outbreak of Escherichia coli
O157:H7 infections traced to jerky made from deer
meat. JAMA 1997;277:1229-31.
23. Kohn MA, Farley TA, Ando T, Curtis M, Wilson SA, Jin
Q, et al. An outbreak of Norwalk virus gastroenteritis
associated with eating raw oysters: implications for
maintaining safe oyster beds. JAMA 1995;273:466-71.
24. Tauxe R, Kruse H, Hedberg C, Potter M, Madden J,
Wachsmuth K. Microbial hazards and emerging issues
associated with produce; a preliminary report to the
National Advisory Committee on Microbiologic Criteria
for Foods. Journal of Food Protection. In press 1997.
25. Wang G, Zhao T, Doyle MP. Fate of enterohemorrhagic
Escherichia coli O157:H7 in bovine feces. Appl Environ
Microbiol 1996;62:2567-70.
26. Zhuang R-Y, Beuchat LR, Angulo FJ. Fate of
Salmonella montevideo on and in raw tomatoes as
affected by temperature and treatment with chlorine.
Appl Environ Microbiol 1995;61:2127-31.
27. Rushing JW, Angulo FJ, Beuchat LR. Implementation
of a HACCP program in a commercial fresh-market
tomato packinghouse: a model for the industry. Dairy,
Food and Environmental Sanitation 1996;16:549-53.
28. Tauxe RV, Hughes JM. International investigations of
outbreaks of foodborne disease: public health responds
to the globalization of food. BMJ 1996;313:1093-4.
29. Hennessey TW, Hedberg CW, Slutsker L, White KE,
Besser-Wiek JM, Moen ME, et al. A national outbreak
of Salmonella enteritidis infections from ice cream. N
Engl J Med 1996;334:1281-6.
30. Passarro DJ, Reporter R, Mascola L, Kilman L,
Malcolm GB, Rolka H, et al. Epidemic Salmonella
Enteritidis infection in Los Angeles County, California:
the predominance of phage type 4. West J Med
1996;165:126-30.
31. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Outbreaks of
Salmonella serotype Enteritidis infection associated with
consumption of raw shell eggs—United States, 1994-
1995. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1996;45:737-42.
32. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Summary
of notifiable diseases, United States, 1995. MMWR
Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1995;44(53).
33. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Proceedings of a national conference on salmonellosis,
March 11-13, 1964. U.S. Public Health Service
Publication No 1262. Washington (DC): U.S.
Government Printing Office; 1965.
34. Bean NH, Morris SM, Bradford H. PHLIS: an
electronic system for reporting public health data from
remote sites. Am J Public Health 1992;82:1273-6.
35. Bean NH, Goulding JS, Lao C, Angulo FJ. Surveillance
for foodborne-disease outbreaks—United States, 1988-
1992. CDC Surveillance Summaries, October 25, 1996.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1996;45(SS-5).
36. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Foodborne
Diseases Active Surveillance Network, 1996. MMWR
Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1997;46:258-61.
37. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Establishment of a national surveillance program for
antimicrobial resistance in Salmonella. MMWR Morb
Mortal Wkly Rep 1996;45:110-1.
38. Hutwagner LC, Maloney EK, Bean NH, Slutsker L,
Martin SM. Using laboratory-based surveillance data
for prevention: an algorithm for detecting Salmonella
outbreaks. Emerg Infect Dis 1997;3:395-400.
39. Meriwether RA. Blueprint for a national public health
surveillance system for the 21st Century. Journal of
Public Health Management and Practice 1996;2:16-23.
40. Mahon BE, Pönkä A, Hall WN, Komatsu K, Dietrich
SE, Siitonen A, et al. An international outbreak of
Salmonella infections caused by alfalfa sprouts grown
from contaminated seed. J Infect Dis 1997;175:876-82.
41. Bell BP, Goldoft M, Griffin PM, Davis MA, Gordon DC,
Tarr PI, et al. A multistate outbreak of Escherichia coli
O157:H7-associated bloody diarrhea and hemolytic
uremic syndrome from hamburgers: the Washington
experience. JAMA 1994;272:1349-53.